478-479 / 536
THE SPEAKING BODY
Xth Congress of the WAP,
Rio de Janeiro 2016
479
478
“Lacan denies that it is beyond psychoanalysis, although the pass is evidently
a strengthening, a supplement to the analytic experience. It is already in the
movement that will drive it, towards the end, to posit a dimension beyond the
unconscious. This already present movement animates the pass.”
p. 23
“And that is how he accounts for the phenomenon, for affinities between the
position of the analyst and the closure of the unconscious. To be the cause of
desire of the analysand, the ideal of the analyst is to close himself off to his own
unconscious, which is precisely what is hidden behind that which grants unity
to what is called orthodox psychoanalysis: the counter–transference which
invites the analyst to take as ideal their being as subject of the unconscious,
while the position of the analyst, according to Lacan, is inverse and
complementary to the analysand position.
The desire of the analyst as a desire to obtain the absolute difference –I take
Lacan’s definition– is not a desire of knowing.”
p. 25-26
“We repeat these days that the symptom is real, that there is a real coming
from the symptom, but this real is first of all imaginary –let’s stop here– it is a
signification. There are registers where it is perceived especially in everything
relative to the complaint about
jouissance
, complaints relative to the masculine
impotence, where the dependence is confirmed with respect to women’s sayings.
As for the feminine relationship with the orgasm, this finds itself deeply marked
by phenomena of belief and a subjective modality subject to variations, which,
if one believes in the real of the symptom at this level, sometimes surprises
because of its flexibility. The first statute of the symptom is imaginary, and it is
in analysis where its symbolic statute moves to the first plane, until a reduction
permits saying that it reaches the symptom as real.”
p. 28
Lacanian Biology and the Event of the Body
(1999). Trans.: B. P.
Fulks and J. Jauregui [LI 18, 2001]
“This analogy of the letter and the germ is evidently made to give us the notion
of a reproduction of the letter, but which supposes the exteriority of knowledge
(
savoir
) in relationship to being, in relationship to body. It is a transmission of
the letter, but in a position of exteriority. Thus Lacan says: ‘Knowledge (
savoir
)
is in the Other. It is a knowledge which is supported by the signifier and which
owes nothing to the knowing (
connaissance
) of life (
vivant
)’.”
p. 21
“What emerges instead is a drive that restores the living to death –the opposite
of self-preservation. Lacan reads it like detours of the signifying system, which is
the Freudian name for the superego. There is in Freud, supported and valued as
such, a dualism of drives. There is death drive, which I translate as drive of the
superego, and there is the sexual drives, life drives adverse to the drives that lead
to death– hence they are not drives of self-preservation, but of reproduction.
Freud bases this dualism on Weismann’s biology, on the difference between
soma and the germ-cell.”
p. 27
“You must notice the striking transformation that Lacan performs on the theory
of drives allegedly grounded on biology. When we say drive we are not taking
into account, in spite of Freud’s repeated warnings, the dualism of the drives:
Lacan’s perspective outclasses the dualism of the drives. Lacan takes great pains
to extract the drive as such from what Freud accepted under the form of this
dualism.”
p. 28
The Symptom and the Body Event
(1999). Trans.: B. P. Fulks [LI 19,
2001]
“Ah! Another couple, the real and truth. The real mocks truth, and in regard
to the real it makes sense to say that variable truth is only a semblance. The
correlate of the real is not truth but certitude, which is, if one wishes, a truth
that does not change. We arrive at certitude of the real only by the signifier as
knowledge, and not as truth. As for truth, it is not eternal except as given by a
God who would only want the good.”
p. 14
“Here we have on the one hand the logic of the signifier with its dead subject,
and on the other the palpitating individual, affected by his unconscious. Because
of these two sides Lacan introduces his hypothesis, knowing that the subject
of the signifier and the individual or affected body are one and the same: “My
hypothesis is that the individual who is affected by the unconscious is the same
individual who constitutes what I call the subject of a signifier.”
This implies that the signifier not only has the effect of signifying, but also the
effect of affect in a body. We have to give the term ‘affect’ all of its generality.
It’s what comes to disturb, to make a trace in the body. The effect of affect also
includes the effect of the symptom, the effect of
jouissance
, and even the effect
of subject, but the effect of subject situated in a body, not as the pure effect of
logic. When it’s a durable effect, a permanent effect, one can justifiably speak of
traces.”
p. 25
Pure Psychoanalysis, Applied Psychoanalysis, and Psychotherapy
(2001). Trans.: B. P. Fulks [LI 20, 2002]
“I remember that Lacan, in a detour in his Seminar, reproached himself
for having once joined them, instead of separating them, in his ‘that which
speaks.’ He reproached himself for having joined the
id
and the unconscious,
Jacques – Alain Miller